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,n the United States to institute martial law. At this-point he differs with
Judge HARE, who, in his learned work on "Constitutional Law," takes
the position that the Executive alone has the power to declare martial
law. Lieutenant BIRKEHIMER would also give this power to Congress.
We advise those of our readers who desire to come to a definite con-
clusion on this interesting and important question to read the arguments
of both Judge HARE and Lieutenant BIRKHIMER. It is in this argument
that our author's ability as a constitutional lawyer is put to a severe test.
If we were asked to point out the distinguishing feature of the book,
we should say that it was the care and exhaustive knowledge of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is seldom we
have the pleasure of recommending to our readers who may be interested
in a particular subject a work better fitted to supply them with accurate
and complete knowledge in an entertaining form. W. D. L.
COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS.
ANOTHER VIEW OF REEVES s. PHILADELPHIA
TRACTION COMPANY.
THz annotator's view of the decision in Reeves v. Philadelphia
Traction Co., 152 Pa., 153, sufira, 127, as "so consistent with the trend
ofjudicial precedents, not only in Pennsylvania but elsewhere," can be
shared only by those who hold with the Court that the Act of May 8,
1876, P. L., 147, "'relating to the use of motive power upon passenger
railways," is a regulation of municipal affairs affecting only incidentally
the charters of certain railway corporations. If the Act be regarded as
designed primarily to extend the franchises of passenger railway com-
panies, and merely involving incidentally a regulation of municipal
affairs, then the limitation of its operation to cities of the first class
would be local legislation, and, therefore, unconstitutional.
That the Act concerns municipal affairs, as well as the franchises of
corporations, is indisputable. The question is, to which does it relate
primarily? If to the former, a subject which can be regulated by a law
applying to a class of cities, then the act is general; otherwise it is local.
The grant to the passenger railways of the right to use other than
animal power, and the grant of power to the councils to give or withhold
consent to the exercise of this right by the railways, are two wholly
different things, and the one need not have been dependent on the other,
as the provision in Article XVII, Section 9, of the Constitution of Penn-
sylvania, requiring the consent of the local authorities, applies only to
the construction of passenger railways. An Act simply permitting all
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passenger railways to use other than animal power, would have been an
Act to increase the utility of their franchises, i. e., practically an amend-
ment of their charters, and it could not have been claimed to be a
regulation of municipal affairs. It is hard to see how the subjecting the
use of such other motive power to municipal cointrol can make the sub-
ject of the law so purely municipal as to warrant a restriction of its
operation to a single class of cities.
The language of the Act is, "Passenger railways, in any, and all
cities of the first class of this commonwealth, may use other than animal
power in the carriage of passengers in their cars, whenever authorized to
do so by the councils of such city, and the limitations contained in any
of the charters of passenger railway companies, restricting them to the
use of horse-power, be, and the same hereby are, repealed;" with a
proviso as to five-cent fares. The second clause of the Act merely
reiterates the first, and expressly includes existing companies in its opera-
tion, but does not affect the meaning of what goes before. The Act
begins with a grant of a corporate privilege to passenger railways in cities
of the first class, and it then proceeds to restrict the exercise of this privi-
lege by requiring the consent of the city councils. Thestructureofthe
Act puts forward the corporate grant as the main object to be attained,
while the provision as to the consent of councils is then added as a proper
restriction, and in analogy to the constitutional requirement of such con-
sent in the case of the construction of a railway.
The title of the Act produces the same impression of its character, as
relafing to the powers of railway companies rather than of councils. It
is "an Act relating to the use of motive power upon passenger railways."
Here there is no mention of cities of the first class, nor of the powers of
councils, nor of aiiything but the use, by passenger railways, of motive
power upon their lines. There is not even any inferential reference to
cities at all, for passenger railways may exist in boroughs and townships
aswell as in cities. If the real subject of this act is the power of councils
in cities of the first class to authorize the use of other than animal power
upon passenger railways, than that is not clearly expressed in the title,
and the Act is unconstitutional for that reason.
Certainly the editor of "Purdon's Digest" understood the law as one
relating primarily to passenger railways, for he placed it among the laws
relating to that subject, and not to that of municipal corporations. In so
doing, he simply understood the subject of the Act as it would ordinarily
be understood, for it can hardly be supposed that the Act was not passed
chiefly at the request of the companies themselves, the provision for the
consent of councils, like that for five-cent fares, being added in 6rder to
facilitate its passage. That the legislature confined- the operation of the
law to cities of the first class is nothing, for it is notorious, as Mr. HAIG'S
note shows, that classification has frequently been used to give an appear-
ance of general legislation to what have subsequently been decided to be
special laws.
The Constitution, Article XVII, Section 9, recognizes passenger rail-
ways as capable of existing in cities, townships and boroughs, and it
requires the authorities of each of these classes of localities to perform
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*a certain municipal function, viz., to grant a formal consent before any
-such railway can be constructed within the limits of the locality. Now,
it has been held that an Act in regard to the incorporation, government
.and -egulation of street railway companies, an Act whose operation
necessarily involved the performance of the municipal function of con-
sent to the construction of such railways, and which expressly provided
-for the performance of this municipal function before any such railway
could be constructed or extended, or could use the tracks of any other
-company, was an Act in regard to passenger railway companies, and not
in regard to municipal affairs, so that the restriction of such an Act to
cities of particular classes made it unconstitutional.' In Reeves v. Phil-
.adelvhia Traction Co., the Court undertakes to distinguish that case
front Weinman v. Pass. Ry. Co. on the ground that the latter related to
the formation of passenger railway corporations, their corporate powers,
!stock, dividends, etc., while the former related merely to the use of
motive power. It is clear, however, that the construction of a passenger
Tailway upon a street, and the use of one set of tracks by different com-
panies, are just as much matters for municipal control as the use of any
particular motive power. The first is indeed expressly made so by the
-Constitution. The object, too, 'of the formation of passenger railway
corporations, the use to which their capital stock is applied, and the
source of their dividends, is this same construction and operation of
street railways to which the consent of councils is so essential. The
-statutes passed upon in these two cases would therefore seem not to differ
greatly in character, as the provisions of both are subject to precisely the
:same exercise of municipal authority, and that for the same reason in
each case, the protection of the city's rights. One statutelprovided for
many details, but the consent of councils was necessary in every case
before the Act could be made of any practical value; while the other pro-
'vided for a single matter, also subject to the same consent of councils.
If the provision for the consent of councils saved the latter Act, why
-could it not have saved the former? Conversely, if a statute to regulate
many details of the action of certain corporations in certain classes of
-cities is unconstitutional, though some of the matters are made expressly
-subject to the approval of councils, and all are practically so, why is the
grant of a single right to the same kind of corporations in one class of
-cities constitutional merely because the consent of councils is provided
for?
The case may be looked at from yet another point of view. The"
'leading Pennsylvania case on the classification of cities, Wheeler v.
Philadelphia, 77 Pa., 338, established the doctrine that such classification
is not a means of evading the Constitution through the forms of law-
not a means of passing laws which are general in form but local in sub-
stance and effect-but that, as all general laws operate upon classes of
-persons, or in classes of localities, or in regard to classes of things, a law
for a properly constituted class of cities (i.e., a class possessingdistinct
,characteristics) in regard to matters which concern those cities especially,
I Weinman z,.'Pass. Ry. Co., i iS Pa., 192.
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is a general law within the contemplation of the Constitution, just as.
much as a law in regard to corporations, married women, railroads,
promissory notes, or any other class of persons or things. This case and
others cited in Mr. HAIG'S note hold, however, thai the sibject to be
regulated by the law must be one which practically requires regulation
confined to the particular class, for if it does not, the law will be local or
special. Now, it cannot be contended that the regulation of the motive
power upon passenger railways is more necessary, more essential to the-
preservation of the rights of individual citizens from infringement by
corporations, in a large city than in a small one, a borough, or a town-
ship. Such regulation may concern more people in the one case than in
the others, but it is of the same character everywhere. Hence, even if
such an Act as that of May 8, 1876, might be regarded as having a muni-
cipal character, it does not affect those matters as to which the various
classes of municipalities differ, and should not be restricted to one class
only.
Even if any reason can be found for requiring the consent of coun-
cils to cities of the first class only, or if the provision for five-cent fares
be proper in such cities only, it does not follow that the use of the kinds.
of motive power allowed by the Act of 1876 should have been restricted
to those cities. A general subject may often require as to certain details
different regulations in the different classes of localities. Thus the fact
that under the election law of June i9, i89i, the provisions as to the per-
sons to supply the ballots, the publication of names, etc., for township
and borough elections, differ somewhat from those for State, city and
county elections, does not make that Act local, those different provisions.
being appropriate to the different classes of localities, but a law providing-
for the use of official ballots in certain classes of localities pnly would be
local, the act of voting being essentially an act of the same character
everywhere.
For the above reasons it may be seriously questioned whether a gen-
eral law, designed to carry out the object of the Act of May i8, 1876,
could properly be restricted to any smaller class than the whole body of
passenger railways in the Commonwealth, subject to the same consent of
the local authorities that the Constitution requires for the construction
of such railways, and possibly to further restrictions in cities of the first
class; and if the Act of May 8, 1876, be less general in its application
than its subje'4t demands, then, under Wheeler v. Philadelphia, and the
line of cases following that decision, it is to be regarded as unconstitu-
tional.
CHARLES CnAUNCBY BINqVE.
